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RELIGION: INDIVIDUAL EXPRESSION OR
INTERTWINED WITH CULTURE?
FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES
AND GREAT BRITAIN
BY JOHANNA R. COLLINS-WOOD*
In contemporary Western society, an individual’s freedom to believe
or not believe in any particular religion is considered a fundamental human
right.1 Part of an individual’s religious belief includes the ability to express
that belief through the individual’s interactions with the greater society.2
However, it is also accepted that states reserve the right to restrict an
individual’s expression of his or her belief in order to facilitate societal
benefits, such as “public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental
rights and freedoms of others.”3 The tension between these two
fundamental beliefs is articulated through the different ways national
judiciaries work out systems of discerning the pivotal moment when a
government’s interest in its citizens’ benefits as a whole allows the
government to intervene and restrict an individual’s expression of his or her
religious beliefs.4 Moreover, the way in which a country’s judiciary
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throughout the writing of this article. I would also like to thank the Reverend Canon Doctor Samuel
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insight into Islamic law and culture, and the Doctors Carol Meyers and Eric Meyers provided me with a
deep knowledge of Jewish law and culture. I am profoundly grateful to all three of them. Finally, I
would like to thank the Reverend Mary Anne Collins-Stauffer for her encouragement to pursue the
research which led to this article, and Benjamin Collins-Wood, for his tireless support and many
rereadings.
1. E.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 18, opened for signature Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
2. Freedom of Religion or Belief Toolkit, FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE 4 (2011),
http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/global-issues/human-rights/freedom-toolkit.
3. ICCPR, supra note 1.
4. Compare Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990) (holding that “if
prohibiting the exercise of religion . . . is not the object...but merely the incidental effect of a generally
applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended.”), with R (on the
Application of Begum) v. Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School, [2006] UKHL 15,
[2007] 1 A.C. 100 (H.L.) [114] (appeal taken from Eng.) (holding that “a limitation [on religion] . . .
must be . . . necessary . . . for a permissible purpose...and must be proportionate in scope and effect).

335

COLLINS FINAL VERSION 4 (DO NOT DELETE)

336

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

5/29/2013 3:19 PM

[Vol. 23:335

chooses to draw the line between an individual’s free expression and the
government’s right to intervene provides an illustration of how that nation
characterizes the fundamental nature of religious beliefs.
The United Kingdom and the United States share a common legal
system and a common heritage, as Great Britain served as the “parent”
from which the United States was born. The two countries’ background of
protection for free expression of religion and the judicial structures for
preserving that freedom are, however, very different. The United States
has a long history of seeking to protect both religious belief and expression
from state control. These freedoms were inscribed into the U.S.
Constitution,5 commented on in writings by the Founding Fathers,6 and
supported by the U.S. Congress.7 The United States’ dual court system
containing both federal and state courts, as well as the evolution of
Supreme Court jurisprudence as a result of various compositions of the
Court’s bench, have produced a complex system for protecting free
expression. Most importantly, the American system has evolved to focus
on an individual’s self-expression of religion. American courts have
specifically chosen not to attempt to determine what constitutes a religious
belief or practice.8 A religious belief may not be “acceptable, logical,
consistent, or comprehensible,”9 and it may not be held by other adherents
to that religion.10 The courts, however, have considered any inquiry into the
legitimacy of the belief as being “not within the judicial function and
judicial competence.”11 Once a petitioner has claimed a violation of the
First Amendment’s freedom of expression clause, the court may only
determine whether the individual’s action is one which has crossed the line
into an area governed by a “compelling state interest.”12
In contrast, the United Kingdom views religion and religious beliefs as
intimately tied to culture, ethnicity, and a larger religious community of
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof”).
6. See generally Letter from Thomas Jefferson, to Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802)
(on file at the Library of Congress), available at http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html.
7. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 439 (2006)
[hereinafter O Centro Espirita] (explaining Congress’ decision to pass RFRA: “Congress recognized
that "laws 'neutral' toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere
with religious exercise," and legislated "the compelling interest test" as the means for the courts to
"strike sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.”).
8. See Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707, 714
(1981).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 715-16.
11. Id. at 716.
12. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
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believers.13 The United Kingdom does not possess a written constitution
guaranteeing any form of human rights or freedoms.14 Issues of freedom of
belief, religious expression, or any other human right must be resolved by
reference to U.K. legislation, general common law, European Union law, or
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).15 Prior to the
establishment of the European Union, and the adoption of the ECHR,
freedom of expression claims could only come before British courts if they
were based on some form of statutory authority, generally the Race
Relations Act of 1976.16 The use of the Race Relations Act to resolve free
expression cases resulted in the British court making determinations about
the authenticity and validity of the plaintiff’s claim religious expression.17
The court adopted this form of judicial inquiry to determine whether the
disputed religious expression could be protected as an aspect of a particular
ethnic or racial group.18 The British statutory system offers a different view
of the nature and function of religion, seeing it as an element that binds a
particular community together and thereby is protectable under the same
statutory regime that protects communities bound by other elements such
as language, race or ethnicity.
The adoption of the ECHR through the United Kingdom’s Human
Rights Act of 199819 offers a second type of protection regime for
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs now have the ability to request relief under ECHR
Article 9, a more general protection provision similar to Article I of the
U.S. Constitution.20 When British courts apply the ECHR, however, they
rely upon precedent from the European Court of Human Rights.21 In
contrast to both the British system’s focus on religion as part of a
community culture, and the American focus on religion as a method of selfexpression, the European Court of Human Rights has chosen not to
characterize the nature of claims for free expression of religion. Instead, it
has simply deferred to the national laws under which these suits arise. As a
13. See generally R. (on the Application of E) v. Governing Body of JFS, [2009] UKSC 15,
[2010] 2 A.C. 728 (S.C.) (appeal taken from Eng.); Mandla (Sewa Singh) v. Dowell Lee, [1983] 2 A.C.
548 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
14. The Legal System of the United Kingdom, CHARTERED INST. OF LEGAL EXECS.,
http://www.ilex.org.uk/about_cilex_lawyers/the_uk_legal_system.aspx (last visited May 5, 2012).
15. Id.
16. See generally, e.g., Mandla, 2 A.C. 548.
17. See generally, e.g., Begum, 1 A.C. 100.
18. See generally, e.g., Mandla, 2 A.C. 548; JFS, 2 A.C. 728.
19. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42.
20. See generally, e.g,, R (on the Application of Williamson) v. Secretary of State for Education
and Employment [2005] UKHL 15, [2005] 2 A.C. 246 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) [hereinafter
Williamson].
21. See Begum, 1 A.C., at 113.
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result, the court has repeatedly not upheld claims for protection for free
expression of religion if there were any other way an individual could
practice the religious expression without the inconvenience or hardship that
generated the lawsuit.22 The British system offers an understanding of
religion that is tied to a cultural framework based on the adoption of other
statutes, such as the Race Relations Act, to the plaintiff’s free expression
plea.23 The interpretations offered by the European Court of Human Rights
do not change or add to this interpretive framework, as the conclusions
drawn by the European Court of Human Rights merely uphold the British
jurisprudence under which the case arose.
Any substantive discussion concerning the different judicial systems
used to draw the line between an individual’s right to free expression of his
or her religious beliefs, and the state’s right to restrict that expression,
requires an understanding of the ways in which different systems
characterize the nature of religion. This note seeks to explore the two
different characterizations of religion offered by the United States and the
United Kingdom, and how those characterizations are used to protect free
exercise in both nations. The American system shows an appreciation for
religious exercise as a method of individualism, and religious expression is
something that is undertaken as an individual. The judicial question is
therefore only whether that individual’s expression has crossed a line into
conduct that the government has determined to be prohibited. The United
Kingdom offers a contrasting approach, viewing religion as something
which is part of a larger cultural and community-based identity. Therefore,
the validity of the religious expression can be analyzed to determine if it
fits within the expressions deemed necessary for that community.
In this paper, I argue that while both of these methods offer valuable
jurisprudence, the American system’s characterization results in a stronger
judicial basis of support for free exercise claims. While the British system
attempts to provide broad protection for free expression, the British system
is constrained by its need to fit the free exercise claim into a cultural or
ethnic context. This produces somewhat strained jurisprudence. These
weaknesses are then compounded in cases brought under the ECHR,
because the U.K. must rely on the decisions made by the European Court of
Human Rights whose free exercise decisions offer plaintiffs little hope of
success.
The structure of this note is as follows: first, I explain the evolution of
the United States’ system of protection for free exercise, as well as its

22. Id.
23. See generally, e.g., JFS, 2 A.C. 728.
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current status. I then turn to the British system and describe the various
ways a free exercise case can be brought in the United Kingdom, as well as
discuss the outcomes of those cases and possible implications of choosing
one strategy over another. Third, I analyze three ways in which the
different methods used by the U.S. and the U.K. to characterize religion
affect their free exercise jurisprudence, and why the characterization
offered by the United States provides plaintiffs with a stronger basis for
judicial support for their free exercise claims. Finally, I offer a brief
conclusion and summary.
I. THE AMERICAN SYSTEM
A. The Constitution and Basic Foundation of Free Exercise
The foundation for American protection of freedom of expression is
the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which states “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.”24 The idea of establishing a government without a
corresponding state religion was an innovative concept, but one which the
Founders were eager to embrace,25 particularly given that many early
settlers to the United States immigrated in order to escape religious
persecution and several states were founded on freedom of religion.26 The
intention of the founders appeared to be that individual exercise of religion
would be enhanced, were religion not tied to the national government, as
articulated by James Madison:
If a further confirmation of the truth could be wanted, it is to be found in
the examples furnished by the States, which have abolished their
religious establishments. I cannot speak particularly of any of the cases
excepting that of Virg[inia][,] where it is impossible to deny that
Religion prevails with more zeal, and a more exemplary priesthood than
it ever did when established and patronized by Public authority.27

The general homogenization of religious practices in early American,
however, resulted in little use being made of the free exercise clause until
the late 1800s, when Mormons wishing to continue their practice of
24. U.S. CONST. amend I.
25. See generally Letter from James Madison, to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822) (on file with
the Princeton University Library); Letter from Thomas Jefferson, supra note 6.
26. The Pilgrims coming to America to worship freely, as well as the founding of Pennsylvania
and Maryland as states which provided religious havens for Quakers and Catholics respectively, are
requisite parts of any United States History class for grade school children.
27. Letter from James Madison, supra note 25.
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polygamy after Utah became a U.S. territory relied on its protection.28 The
Supreme Court, however, swiftly and sharply struck down these
Constitutional appeals on the grounds that while “Congress cannot pass a
law for the government of the Territories which shall prohibit the free
exercise of religion . . . it may safely be said there never has been a time in
any State of the Union when polygamy has not been an offence against
society, cognizable by the civil courts and punishable with more or less
severity.”29 For the next half century, the rule appeared to be that while no
state could prohibit religious belief, it could prohibit certain forms of
religious conduct.
It was not until the late 1940s that the Supreme Court began to
articulate what would develop into the contemporary free exercise
jurisprudence. In Everson v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court
upheld a law permitting tax-raised funds to pay for the busing of all New
Jersey children to school, including Catholic schoolchildren attending
parochial schools.30 Despite their approval of state funds being used in this
manner, the Court expressed for the first time its view that a “wall of
separation” must exist between church and state.31 The Court maintained,
however, that while there was to be a “wall” between church and state so as
to avoid the establishment of religion, the state “cannot hamper its citizens
in the free exercise of their own religion . . . it cannot exclude
individual[s] . . . because of their faith or lack of it, from receiving the
benefits of public welfare legislation.”32 This statement by the Court meant
that citizens of states were free to take advantage of public legislation
which would facilitate a citizen’s individual exercise of his or her religion,
without such action being considered an endorsement or “establishment” of
that religion.
B. Sherbert v. Verner
It was not until the 1960s that the Supreme Court developed a firm test
for determining when the government might curtail an individual’s right to
free expression of religion, whereby an infringement of free exercise rights
could only be justified by “a compelling state interest in the regulation of a
subject within the State’s constitutional power to regulate.’”33 In 1963, a
28. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333
(1890); Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
29. Reynolds, 98 U.S.at 162, 165.
30. Everson, 330, U.S. at 18 (1947).
31. Id. at 18.
32. Id. at 16.
33. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
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case was brought by a Seventh-Day Adventist appellant, arguing that the
state of South Carolina could not deny her unemployment compensation on
the grounds that her refusal to work on Saturdays, the holy day of her faith,
meant that she had refused employment without good cause.34 The South
Carolina Supreme Court had found that her “ineligibility infringed no
constitutional liberties” because the statute requiring her not to refuse
employment without good cause placed no restrictions on her freedom of
belief or the free exercise of her religion.35 In contrast, the appellant argued
that the free exercise clause should prevent the state from disallowing her
benefits.36
The Court noted that while the government could not regulate
religious beliefs, it could regulate conduct when the “actions so regulated
have . . . posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order,”37
but only if the burden on free exercise resulted from a “compelling state
interest in the regulation of a subject within the State’s constitutional power
to regulate.”38 Moreover, if the burden on free exercise was the effect of a
law which impeded religious observance, or discriminated between
religions, such a law was invalid even if the burden on free exercise was
indirect.39
The Court found that the appellant’s disqualification indirectly
burdened her free exercise because the disqualification exerted severe
pressure on her to abandon her religious beliefs.40 In addition, South
Carolina had specifically exempted Sunday observers from having to make
a similar choice.41 Finally, the Court found there was no compelling state
interest behind the enforcement of the statute, as appellees had suggested
only that people requesting unemployment might falsely claim religious
objections to Saturday work.42 The Court found that even if this was a
legitimate concern, the state would have to show that “no alternative forms
of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First
Amendment rights.”43 Through Sherbert, the Supreme Court put the burden
on the state to prove that a limitation on free expression was the only
34. Id. at 399-400.
35. Id. at 401.
36. See id. at 402.
37. Id. at 402-03.
38. Id. at 403.
39. Id. at 404.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 406 (noting that as the state had passed a law permitting textile workers
“conscientiously opposed to Sunday work” to not lose their job or their seniority by their refusal).
42. Id. at 407.
43. Id. (emphasis added).
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solution to a compelling problem.
C. Wisconsin v. Yoder
The Supreme Court expounded upon the Sherbert compelling interest
test in Wisconsin v. Yoder and maintained the Court’s legal conviction that
an individual’s First Amendment right to free exercise of his or her religion
was something courts should strongly protect. In Yoder, the defendants
were Old Order Amish parents who refused to send their children to public
school beyond 8th grade44 on the grounds that it was against the tenants of
their faith.45 Wisconsin had recently introduced a law mandating that all
children attend public school until age 16, and the Amish parents were
found to be in violation of this law.46 The Amish parents appealed under
the First Amendment, arguing that it was within the free exercise of their
religion to refuse to allow their children to attend public school after 8th
grade.47
In Yoder, the Supreme Court applied the Sherbert test, repeating that
“activities of individuals, even when religiously based, are often subject to
regulation by the States . . . [but] there are areas of conduct protected by the
Free Exercise Clause . . . [that are] beyond the power of the State to
control.”48 In contrast, however, to their statements in Sherbert, which
focused almost exclusively on the state’s action, in Yoder the Court spent
significant time establishing that the Amish peoples’ beliefs were sincere,
that they were the product of a long and notable religious tradition,49 and
that there would be no ill effects resulting from the decision to permit the
Amish to remove their children from formal school after completion of 8th
grade.50 The Court noted that “we must be careful to determine whether the
Amish religious faith and their mode of life are, as they claim, inseparable
and interdependent.”51 This wording was quite different from Sherbert,
which made no attempt to determine whether the respondent’s religious
belief in Saturday as the Sabbath was “inseparable and interdependent”
from a mode of life which required her to not work on the Sabbath.
44. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972).
45. Id. at 209 (noting that Old Order Amish communities believed children’s attendance at high
school was contrary to the Amish religion and way of life).
46. Id. at 207-08.
47. Id. at 208-09.
48. Id. at 220.
49. Id. at 210 (explaining that the Amish have rejected material culture since the 16th century,
and that the objection to formal education is grounded in this belief).
50. See id. at 212 (“[T]he Amish succeed in preparing their high school age children to be
productive members of the Amish community.”).
51. Id. at 215.
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The Court clearly stated that Amish parents were permitted, under the
free exercise clause, to refuse to send their children to public school after
8th grade.52 However, the Court seemed to wrestle with the reasoning
behind this ruling, resulting in a lengthy discussion on the history and
authenticity of the Amish faith, and their repeated declarations that
imposing the public education requirement on Old Order Amish would
severely limit their religious expression.53 In addition, the Court appeared
eager to show that the state’s interest in children remaining in school until
16 could be achieved in other ways.54 Yoder appeared to solidify the
“compelling state interest” test, ensuring that the state would carry a heavy
burden when attempting to show the necessity of burdening free exercise of
religion.
D. Employment Division v. Smith
With the application of the “compelling interest” test in Yoder, it
appeared that the Supreme Court had firmly established the American law,
for both state and federal courts, as regards the free exercise clause. The
evolution of the Supreme Court, however, from a conglomerate of more
liberal justices in the 1960s and 1970s, to the more conservative Rehnquist
Court in the early 1990s, 55 created a dramatic shift in free exercise
interpretation, notably expressed in Employment Division v. Smith.
The ingestion of peyote, a form of cactus,56 was deemed by Oregon to
be possession of a “controlled substance” in violation of the Federal
Controlled Substances Act,57 even when such ingestion was part of a
religious ceremony where the drug was used as a sacrament.58 Respondents
were fired from their jobs and denied unemployment benefits after having
ingested peyote as part of a Native American Church ceremony.59 Upon
52. Id. at 234.
53. Id. at 219 (“[T]he unchallenged testimony of acknowledged experts in education and religious
history, almost 300 years of consistent practice, and strong evidence of a sustained faith pervading and
regulating respondents' entire mode of life support the claim that enforcement of the State's requirement
of compulsory formal education after the eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free
exercise of respondents' religious beliefs.”).
54. Id. at 224 (noting that should Amish children choose to leave the church, their practical
training would make it unlikely that they would become burdens on society).
55. Chief Justice Rehnquist began as an Associate Justice on the court in 1972, was promoted to
Chief Justice in 1986 and led an increasingly conservative bloc of justices. See William H. Rehnquist,
THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY, http://www.supremecourthistory.org/history-of-thecourt/chief-justices/william-rehnquist-1986-2005/.
56. OMAR C. STEWART, PEYOTE RELIGION: A HISTORY 3 (University of Oklahoma Press 1987).
57. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
58. Id. at 874-75.
59. Id. at 874.

COLLINS FINAL VERSION 4 (DO NOT DELETE)

344

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

5/29/2013 3:19 PM

[Vol. 23:335

first examination, it appeared that the Smith case would follow the
“compelling interest” test expressed in Yoder, and the state would be forced
to establish compelling arguments for why religious peyote use should not
be permitted. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, however, declared that the
Supreme Court had “never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse
him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that
the State is free to regulate”60 and that the free exercise clause did not
excuse an individual from an “obligation to comply with a valid and neutral
law of general applicability.”61
In addition, the Court stated that “[t]he only decisions in which we
have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally
applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free
Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with
other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the
press.”62 The Court further noted that Smith did not present this form of
dual claim.63 In respect to the Sherbert test, the Court wrote, “We have
never invalidated any governmental action on the basis of the Sherbert test
except the denial of unemployment compensation[,]”64 and commented
that, in recent cases, it had declined to even apply the Sherbert test.65 The
Court held instead that Sherbert was inapplicable to free exercise
challenges to prohibitions on particular forms of religious conduct.66
The Court’s decision in Smith produced severe protests by religious
groups and an almost immediate response from Congress. A coalition of
both left- and right-wing religious rights groups67 formed to request
Congressional action. Within two years of Smith, Congress passed the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which restored the Sherbert
test as an acceptable defense for people who found their free exercise of
religion burdened by governmental legislation.68 RFRA specifically stated
60. Id. at 878-79.
61. Id. at 879 (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. Id. at 881.
63. Id. at 882.
64. Id. at 883.
65. Id. at 883-84.
66. Id. at 884-86.
67. The coalition included such unfamiliar bedfellows as the American Civil Liberties Union, the
National Association of Evangelicals, the Southern Baptist Convention, the Mormon Church, and the
American Jewish Congress. Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs Law Protecting Religious Practices, THE
NEW YORK TIMES, (Nov. 17, 1993), available at http://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/17/us/clinton-signslaw-protecting-religious-practices.html?pagewanted=1&src=pm.
68. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) § 2(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.
[hereinafter RFRA] (“The purposes of [the Act] are— (1) to restore the compelling interest test as set
forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to
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that in order to burden religion, the government must prove that the burden
“(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.69 Despite the Supreme Court’s rejection of the “compelling
interest” test for free exercise, it appeared that public opinion and
Congressional legislation had been able to preserve the Sherbert test.
E. Development of the Current Bifurcated State and Federal System
The Supreme Court, however, was not inclined to have its decision in
Smith dismissed so quickly through an act of Congress. In City of Boerne v.
Flores, the Catholic Archbishop of San Antonio applied for a building
permit to enlarge his church.70 When the permit was denied under an
ordinance preserving historic buildings, he brought suit under RFRA to
challenge the ordinance,71 but the District Court ruled that, as applied to
state laws, RFRA was not a proper exercise of Congress’s Section 5 power
to enforce the 14th Amendment.72
The Supreme Court agreed with the District Court, noting that
“Congress’ power under Section 5 . . . extends only to enforcing the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . not the power to determine
what constitutes a constitutional violation.”73 The Court noted that RFRA
appeared to “attempt a substantive change in constitutional protections . . .
[which] apply to every agency and official of the Federal, State and local
Governments,”74 which it found to be highly in excess of the forms of
Congressional action permitted under the Constitution. In addition, the
Court worried that “[t]he stringent test RFRA demands of state laws reflect
a lack of proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the
legitimate end to be achieved”75 and concluded that “the provisions of the
federal statute here invoked are beyond congressional authority.”76 City of
Boerne therefore created a bifurcated system, wherein free exercise claims
brought under state law would be subject to the Supreme Court’s test of

guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and (2) to
provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by
government.”).
69. RFRA, supra note 69, at 3(b)(1),(2).
70. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 519 (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. Id. at 532.
75. Id. at 533.
76. Id. at 536.
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Formal Neutrality, as explain in Smith,77 while free exercise claims brought
under federal law would still be subject to the Sherbert test as described in
RFRA.
The right to bring a free exercise claim against federal law under
RFRA was upheld in O Centro Espirita v. Gonzales, where a minority
Brazilian religious sect who practiced in Florida was permitted, as part of a
religious ritual, to drink tea which included a hallucinogenic plant.78 The
Court noted that under RFRA, the government must establish (1) a
compelling government interest in burdening an individual’s free exercise
of religion, and (2) the burden must be the least restrictive method of
furthering that interest.79 The Court concluded that the government’s
interest in preventing the diversion of the tea from the church members to
recreational users was a slippery-slope argument not compelling enough to
restrict the church’s use of the tea.80 In doing so, the Court affirmed the use
of RFRA as a tool for courts to recognize exceptions to federal laws which
infringe on free exercise,81 thereby maintaining the Sherbert test as the
legitimate standard for courts to apply when dealing with federal
regulations.
As a result of the evolution of American common law, the United
States currently applies the Sherbert test to any federal law deemed to
impede the free exercise of religion. The federal government must,
therefore, show that (1) there was a compelling government interest for the
enactment of the law and (2) the law which created a burden on free
exercise must be the least restrictive method of furthering that government
interest. However, with the exception of those areas covered by the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 82 state
laws are still governed by the Smith test, which requires only that the law
be neutral on its face, but permits laws which have the effect of burdening
free exercise of religion.

77. Id. at 536 (“[I]t is this court’s precedent, not RFRA, which must control.”). This is not true of
all state claims. Under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000,42
U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., states are prohibited from imposing burdensome zoning laws on religious
buildings, and may not impose burdens on the free exercise of religion by state prisoners. This
provision was upheld in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
78. O Centro Espirita, 546 U.S. at 423.
79. Id. at 424.
80. Id. at 436.
81. Id. at 434.
82. RLUIPA prevents the imposition of burdensome land use regulations on religious assemblies
or institutions, and protects the free exercise of religion for institutionalized persons. Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006)
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II. THE BRITISH SYSTEM
A. An Overview of the British Legal System
The United Kingdom’s legal system includes law which applies to all
four countriesScotland, Ireland, Wales, and England, as well as the bodies
of laws which are created by and regulate the individual countries.83 There
is no written constitution in the United Kingdom, and, therefore, law that
would be considered “constitutional” in other countries arises instead from
statutes, judicial precedent or common law conventions.84 As a member of
the European Union, the United Kingdom also incorporates European
legislation into their judicial system, including the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR), and recognizes the jurisdiction of and precedents
from the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human
Rights.85 According to the British House of Lords, if there is a conflict
between EU law and the law of the United Kingdom, the EU law must be
supreme.86 The House of Lords was the highest Court of Appeal for Great
Britain, until the establishment of a Supreme Court in 2005.87
The Church of England is still the established church of the nation, but
its power is largely symbolic and its existence appears to neither enhance
nor impede British protection of free exercise.88 The United Kingdom does
not currently possess any statutes specifically requiring the state to uphold
free exercise, though the Equality Act of 2006 includes religion as one of
its protected characteristics.89 As a result, plaintiffs must rely either on
another statutory provision which can be adapted to cover free exercise
claims, or, more recently, bring such claims under the ECHR.
B. Claims Brought Under the Race Relations Act of 1976
The Race Relations Act of 1976 (Race Relations Act) was intended to
provide “racial groups” with an ability to seek relief from discrimination on

83. Sarah Carter, A Guide to the UK Legal System, GLOBALEX, (Nov. 2005),
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/United_Kingdom.htm#BACKGROUND. The law discussed in
this note is the general law which governs all four kingdoms, but will be referred to as British law
because the cases discussed arise under the court system in Great Britain.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See generally Andrew Lynch, The Constitutional Significant of the Church of England in
LAW AND RELIGION 168-196 (Peter Radan, et al. eds., 2005).
89. The Equality Act, 2006, c. 3 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006
/3/pdfs/ukpga_20060003_en.pdf.
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racial grounds.90 The term “racial group” included color, race, nationality,
and ethnic or national origins of a person.91 Since many religions, and
particularly minority religions, are in some way tied to ethnic groups, the
expansion of the definition of “racial group” allowed people to bring free
exercise claims under the Race Relations Act, provided they could show
that their religion was strongly tied to a racial or ethnic component.
1. Mandla v. Dowell Lee
In Mandla v. Dowell Lee, a Sikh boy was denied admission to a
private school on the grounds that the school’s uniform policy did not
permit the wearing of a turban in school.92 Although such a case could
clearly be viewed as a free exercise claim, under British law the boy’s
father brought an action against the school for racial discrimination. The
father sought a declaration that Sikhs were a racial group under the Race
Relations Act that wearing a turban was a requirement of the Sikh religion,
and therefore, his son could not be denied entrance to school based on his
religious requirement to wear a turban.93
In order to receive such protection, however, Sikhs had to qualify as a
racial group under the requirements of the Race Relations Act. The House
of Lords determined that the phrase “ethnic group,” as used in the Race
Relations Act, meant that the group “must . . . regard itself, and be regarded
by others, as a distinct community by virtue of certain characteristics.”94
The court then defined seven characteristics of an ethnic group, including
“a common religion different from that of neighboring groups or from the
general community surrounding it.”95 Since House of Lords determined
that Sikhs were “a distinctive and self-conscious community” who fit the
enumerated characteristics of an ethnic group, discrimination against Sikhs
was determined to be a violation of the Race Relations Act.96
One form of discrimination under the Race Relations Act was the
application of “a requirement or condition which . . . would apply
equally . . . but . . . is to the detriment of [the] other because [the other]
90. Race Relations Act, 1976, c. 74 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk
/ukpga/1976/74/pdfs/ukpga_19760074_en.pdf.
91. Id. at 3(1).
92. Mandla, 2 A.C.559.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 562.
95. Id. (noting that a shared history and cultural tradition were considered “essential”
characteristics of an ethnic group, while being a minority or an oppressed group, a common
geographical origin, and common language, common literature and common religion which all differed
from the surrounding majority were considered “relevant”).
96. Id. at 565.

COLLINS FINAL VERSION 4(DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

5/29/2013 3:19 PM

RELIGION: INDIVIDUAL EXPRESSION OR INTERTWINED WITH CULTURE?

349

cannot comply with it.”97 The court determined that, since ethnic origins
were inherited and unalterable, such compliance must be “consistent[] with
the customs and cultural conditions”98 of the ethnic group. Since wearing a
turban was a religious condition imposed by Sikh “customs and cultural
conditions,” a requirement to not wear a turban was a condition the son
could not comply with, and, therefore, was racially discriminatory.99
2. R (Watkins-Singh) v. Governing Body of Aberdare Girl’s High School
Although the ECHR was adopted in 1998 and provided a statute under
which plaintiffs could bring free exercise claims,100 plaintiffs found it was
preferable to bring claims under the Race Relations Act when possible, as
courts were more likely to find in their favor.101 In this case, a young Sikh
girl was forbidden to wear a Kara, a silver bangle bracelet worn by
observant Sikhs, to her high school, as such an item was forbidden under
the school’s dress code policy.102 The Mandla decision had already defined
Sikhs as an ethnic group, and so the U.K. Supreme Court proceeded with
an analysis of whether the claimant had a religious obligation stemming
from her ethnicity to wear the Kara.103 The Court determined that while
wearing it was not mandatory, the claimant felt it was an extremely
important indication of her faith.104
The Court adopted four steps to determine whether the claimant had
been subjected to indirect discrimination.105 First, the Court determined that
the “provision, criterion or practice” at issue was the school’s policy
permitting only one pair of stud earrings to be worn and no other
jewelry.106 Second, the policy’s effect on the claimant, in prohibiting the
claimant to practice this aspect of her religion, was compared to the
policy’s effects on other students whose religious practices were not in
conflict with the policy.107 Third, the Court found that since the policy did

97. Race Relations Act, at 1(1)(b)(iii).
98. Mandla, 2 A.C.566.
99. Id.
100. See generally Human Rights Act, 1998, (U.K.)..
101. See infra Part II.C (discussing British case law appealed under article 9 of the ECHR). See
generally JFS, 2 A.C. 728; R. (on the Application of Watkins-Singh) v. The Governing Body of
Aberdare Girls’ High School, [2008] EWHC 1865 (Admin), [2008] W.L. 2872609, available at
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2008/1865.html.
102. Watkins-Singh, W.L. 2872609 ¶ 10.
103. See id. ¶ 23-30.
104. Id. ¶ 29.
105. Id. ¶ 38.
106. Id. ¶ 39.
107. Id. ¶ 43.
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not harm other students whose religious practices were not in controversy
with the policy, it must examine whether the claimant suffered a “particular
disadvantage or determinant” by the policy, based on whether “(a) that
person genuinely believed . . . that wearing this item was a matter of
exceptional importance to . . . racial identity or . . . religious belief and (b)
the wearing of this item can be shown objectively to be of exceptional
importance to his or her religion or race, even if . . . not an actual
requirement . . . .”108 Fourth, the Court contended that the prohibition
against wearing the Kara was disproportionate and not justifiable, because
the Kara was a small item, and the prohibition on wearing it constrained the
claimant’s religious freedom.109 The claimant should, therefore, be
permitted to wear the Kara as an expression of her religion as connected to
her Sikh ethnicity.
3. R. v. Governing Body of JFS and Admissions Appeal Panel of JFS
The interconnection between ethnicity and religion was strengthened
in R. v. Governing Body of JFS and Admissions Appeal Panel of JFS,
where the Court determined that adoption of certain religions permitted a
person to adopt a new ethnicity as well. A person could thereby claim the
protection of the Race Relations Act for their right to free exercise of their
newly adopted religion. A teenage boy whose father was ancestrally
Jewish, but whose mother was an Italian Catholic who had converted to
Masorti Judaism wished to attend JFS, a public Orthodox Jewish School.110
The claimant was denied admission because the school required that all
pupils be of Jewish descent as defined in the Orthodox tradition: each
pupil’s mother must have either been born Jewish, or have converted to
Orthodox Judaism.111
The Court reviewed the Mandla test for ethnicity and determined that
Jews qualified as an ethnic group. The Court, however, concluded that
adopting the Jewish faith also automatically granted a person Jewish
ethnicity as well, because for Jews, religion and ethnicity were
intertwined.112 Significantly, the Court held that any adoption of the Jewish
faith, no matter what form (conservative, reform, orthodox, etc.), would
convey on the convert both the Jewish faith and the Jewish ethnicity.113 As

108. Id. ¶ 56.
109. See id. ¶¶ 72-91.
110. JFS, 2 A.C. 744. In the UK it is very common for public, state-supported schools to be
religiously affiliated and limit their enrollment to members of that religion.
111. Id. at 753.
112. Id.
113. See id.
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a result, JFS’s refusal to admit the claimant because the claimant was not
“properly” Jewish was deemed to be direct racial discrimination under the
Race Relations Act.114
The claimant wished to freely exercise his religion by requesting
admission to a school which observed the religious faith that he determined
he belonged to. The Court deemed that the school could not deny him
admission based on religious reasons because through his mother’s
conversion, he acquired both a religion and an ethnicity. His Jewish
ethnicity protected against the religious discrimination, because it was fully
imparted regardless of how his mother converted to Judaism. The Court
repeatedly emphasized that for Jews, “it is almost impossible to distinguish
between ethnic status and religious status.”115 This case was deemed a free
exercise case because it barred the school from denying the claimant the
ability to be viewed as Jewish for purposes of admission standards.
C. Claims Brought Under the ECHR Art. 9
The European Convention on Human Rights was incorporated into
British law through the Human Rights Act of 1998.116 It included Article 9,
which states:
Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of
public order, health or morals, or the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.117

For the first time in British law, this gave plaintiffs a statutory provision
under which they could bring free exercise of religion suits.118 In addition,
the application of the ECHR meant that British courts could now rely on
the precedents of the European Court of Justice and the European Court of
Human Rights, known as the Strasbourg Court.119 It is nonetheless
questionable whether this actually provides more protection for free
exercise, as the Strasbourg Court has consistently upheld the rights of states
to restrict free exercise of religion, as long as the state can establish a
114. Id. at 754.
115. Id. at 752.
116. See generally Human Rights Act, 1998, (U.K.).
117. European Convention on Human Rights art 9, Nov. 4, 1950, ETS 5 [hereinafter ECHR]
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeTraites.asp?MA=3&CM=7&CL=ENG.
118. See EDWARD J. EBERLE, CHURCH AND STATE IN WESTERN SOCIETY 34 (Ashgate Publishing,
2011).
119. Id.
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legitimate reason for doing so.120
1. R v. Williamson
Since 1987, school teachers in state schools or schools which received
public funding were banned from administering corporal punishment to
children.121 The claimants, however, adhered to a fundamentalist form of
Christianity, which prescribed corporal punishment as an appropriate
disciplinary action for misbehaving children.122 They were the head
teachers, teachers and parents of children at four Christian schools who
claimed that the statutory ban interfered with their right to freely exercise
their religious beliefs.123 The Court notes that “religious faiths call for more
than belief,”124 but notes that the “freedom to manifest belief is qualified”
under Article 9 in order to maintain a peaceful pluralistic society.125
Where a claimant’s professed belief is at issue, Article 9 requires the
Court to inquire into the genuineness of the claimant’s belief so as to
ensure that the religious belief is made in good faith.126 The Court,
however, is not to inquire into the validity of the espoused belief.127 The
standard requirements for a belief is that it must be consistent with basic
standards of human dignity or integrity, it must relate to matters that are
more than trivial, it must possess an adequate degree of seriousness and
importance, and it must be coherent.128 Though the Court considered
whether a belief in corporal punishment could be considered inconsistent
with basic standards of human integrity, it chose to consider the belief
valid.129
Although the Court recognized that the ban on corporal punishment
acted as an interference on a valid religious belief, it deemed that
interference justified because it was, within the meaning of Article 9,
interference “necessary in a democratic society . . . for the protection of the
120. See generally e.g., Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France, App. No. 27417/95, ECHR (2000),
available at http://strasbourgconsortium.org/document.php?DocumentID=172; Karaduman v. Turkey,
App. No. 16278/90, ECHR (1993), available at http://strasbourgconsortium.org/document.php?
DocumentID=4237; Ahmad v. United Kingdom, 4 EHRR 126 (1981); Sahin v. Turkey, App. No.
44774/98, ECHR (2010), available at http://strasbourgconsortium.org/document.php?DocumentID=
2103.
121. Williamson, 2 A.C., at 253-54.
122. Id. at 255.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 257.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 258.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 258-59.
129. See id. at 260.
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rights and freedoms of others.”130 The Court explained that the statute
pursued the legitimate aim of protecting vulnerable children, because it was
known that corporal punishment deliberately inflicted physical violence
and the legislation was intended to protect against harmful effects that
might result from such violence.131 The Court also noted that the statute
was not disproportionate, as parents were still free to administer mild
corporal punishment to their children within the privacy of their homes.132
The Court concluded that the legislature, while bound to respect the
parents’ religious beliefs, was permitted to determine that manifesting
those beliefs was not in the best interests of children, and therefore, a broad
social policy against such practices was warranted.133
2. R (Begum) v. Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School
The R (Begum) v. Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High
School134 decision was notable for its extensive use of precedent from the
European Court of Human Rights and for its holding that not only can the
state determine limitations on the free expression of religion, but such
responsibilities can also be delegated to sub-entities, such as schools, and
these entities’ decisions concerning the limitations of free expression are to
be respected. The claimant in Begum attended a secondary school whose
dress code included the shalwar kameez, a Middle Eastern garment, as a
uniform option for Muslim female students.135 For the first few years at
school, the claimant wore the shalwar kameez, but after living with her
older brother, came to school and stated that she wished to wear a jilbab, a
more conservative Muslim garment.136 The school denied her request, and
the claimant brought suit under Article 9 of the ECHR.137
In making their decision, the Court cited extensively from Strasbourg
Court precedent, noting that “[t]he Strasbourg institutions have not been at
all ready to find an interference with the right to manifest religious
belief . . . where a person has voluntarily accepted . . . [a] role which does
not accommodate that practice . . . and there are other means . . . to practice
or observe his or her religion . . .”138 Since the claimant had been given full
opportunity to attend other schools where she could wear the jilbab, the
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 264 (quoting ECHR, supra note 117, art. 9).
Id.
See id. at 264-65.
Id. at 265.
[2007] 1 A.C.100.
I., at 108.
Id. at 108-09.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 112-13.
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Court found that upholding the school’s rule against a claim for free
exercise was supported by precedent.139 The Court also found that under
British law, the school’s decision to create and enforce a dress code which
sought a middle ground between varying Muslim traditions of dress was
justifiable.140 As to the issue of proportionality, the Court noted that the
school “had taken immense pains to devise a uniform . . . which respected
Muslim beliefs . . . in an inclusive, unthreatening and uncompetitive
way.”141 Finally, the Court concluded that the “power of decision” had been
given to the school as it was “best placed to exercise it” and, therefore,
should be trusted to make appropriate decisions, even if those decisions
infringed upon free exercise.142
3. Eweida v. British Airways
In a case which was popularized by the news media,143 a Christian
working as a check-in staff member of British Airways requested the right
to visibly wear a silver cross during work.144 Her request was denied under
BA’s dress code policy.145 The Court found that the airline’s position was
justified because it had the right to create a basic dress code for its
employees, and the dress code did not place Christians in general at a
disadvantage.146 The Court thereby appeared to uphold its view that
institutions such as a school (in Begum) or an employer could make
reasonable decisions concerning various requirements, including a dress
code, by which its employees, students, or people who utilized its services
had to abide.
The Court continued its precedent of showing strong favoritism
towards institutional discretion by repeating its standard that the
institution’s policy could only be overcome if the appellant showed a strict
religious duty to wear a certain item or act in a certain way, and an absolute
inability to receive the same or similar service or benefit if the appellant’s
claim was denied. The Court noted that there was no suggestion that the
claimant’s beliefs required her to wear a cross.147 In addition, no precedent
139. Id. at 114.
140. Id. at 108.
141. Id. at 117 (appearing deeply concerned that allowing one girl to wear the jilbab may create
pressure for other Muslim girls to wear such garment who otherwise would choose not to wear it).
142. Id.
143. Shirley Chaplin and Nadia EweidaTtakeCcrossFfight to Europe, BBC NEWS, (Feb. 12, 2010,
12:41 GMT), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-devon-17346834.
144. Eweida v. BA [2010] EWCA (Civ) 80, [2010] I.C.R. 890 [892].
145. Id.
146. See id. at 899-900.
147. Id. at 900-01.
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under Article 9 of the ECHR supported the claimant’s position, as she was
free to seek other employment where she could wear a cross.148
Finally, the Court appeared to add a new requirement for free exercise
claims when they stated that “disadvantage to a single individual arising
out of her wish to manifest her faith in a particular way”149 was not
sufficient to be deemed religious discrimination and necessitate a ruling
under Article 9. The Court noted that “the detriment of [the appellant] was
suffered by her alone: neither . . . was anyone else similarly
disadvantaged.”150 This new requirement reinforces the necessity of
proving that the action at issue is a strict religious duty imposed on all
members of that religious group. Without the ability to prove this, most
free exercise claims will fail because they would be deemed “disadvantages
to a single individual,” rather than religious discrimination against an entire
group.
III. ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON
A. Characterization through Case Law
In the American system, the characterization of free exercise as an
individual right is evidenced in both the constitutional protection and
statutory protections. The inclusion of free exercise in the amendment
protecting freedom of speech and the press indicates that the founders
conceived of free exercise as a right which one exercised as an individual,
much like an individual’s right to speak.151 The introduction to RFRA
shows that when the Supreme Court had, in the view of the American
people, abrogated their responsibility to uphold an individual’s right to free
exercise, Congress intervened to ensure that any burden on free exercise be
done only out of great necessity.152 They did not, however, qualify this
protection with any stipulations concerning the nature, authenticity or
validity of the religious belief.
In addition, while the facial neutrality test of Smith appeared to reduce
the level of protection for free exercise, the breadth of its scope is evidence
148. Id. at 897-98.
149. Id. at 901.
150. Id. at 899.
151. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson, supra note 6; Letter from James Madison, supra note
25.
152. See RFRA §§ 2(a)(1)-(b)(2) (stating “[T]he framers of the Constitution, recognizing free
exercise of religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to the
Constitution . . . governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without compelling
justification...the purposes of this Act are . . . to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious
exercise is substantially burdened by government.”)
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that the Supreme Court chose to uphold its characterization of religious
expression as an individual matter, because they provided no cultural or
ethnic-based exceptions to Smith. It has been argued that Smith “draw[s]
upon a long history of official United States accommodation of religious
practice” which favors majority religions.153 Even if this were true, the
favoring of majority religions is different than characterizing religion as
one element within the greater framework of a majority or minority culture.
Moreover, the Smith test has been understood by some scholars to
“discourage government hostility to religion”154 on the grounds that “the
inquiry into neutrality is designed to place religious claimants on par with
other claimants in society [particularly when concerning] government
aid.”155 Part of being placed “on par with other claimants” is that religion is
viewed as its own separate element, to be protected or infringed on apart
from other protected elements (i.e. gender, ethnicity, race). Though the
Smith test may have resulted in a lack of judicial protection, its creation
indicates that the Court’s characterization of religion as an individual right
did not change.
The Smith test has now been partially overruled by RFRA.156 In
dealing with facially neutral laws, the Court has determined that not only is
mere facial neutrality not determinative,157 but that “the effect of a law in
its real operation is strong evidence of its object.”158 Should it be
determined that a law was designed to be “an impermissible attempt to
target petitioners and their religious practices,” such a law will not be
permitted to stand, even though it can be deemed facially neutral.159 Again,
there is no stipulation that the religious practices be appropriate or valid,
merely that the plaintiffs sincerely hold these practices to be religious.160
The United Kingdom provides statutory protection for free exercise
claims under the Equality Act of 2006 and the Race Relations Act of
1976,161 as well as Human Rights Act of 1998 which incorporated the
153. See EBERLE, supra note 119, at 161 (noting that in Mueller v. Allen, formal neutrality enabled
the court to uphold a statute allowing taxpayers to deduct expenses from gross income up to a certain
amount if they chose to send their children to a private, usually religious, school).
154. Id. at 157.
155. Id. at 156-57.
156. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (stating that “it is this Court’s
precedent, not RFRA, which must control”); Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 434 (2006) (stating that RFRA would apply to federal laws)
157. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993).
158. See id. at 535.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 531 (noting that a petitioner’s religious assertion “cannot be deemed bizarre or
incredible”).
161. See EBERLE, supra note 119, at 33, 35.
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ECHR.162 British courts have not decided free exercise cases under the
Equality Act of 2006, choosing instead to protect minority religious rights
under the Race Relations Act.163 Implicit in the application of this statute is
the requirement that any religious practice protected under it be deemed
part of an ethnic group.164 Such a characterization allows British courts to
show respect for religious practices which are an integral part of a
particular culture.165 This characterization subordinates religion to race and
ethnicity. Religious expression is not viewed as something which an
individual undertakes on his or her own, but rather something which is
practiced within a greater community.166 In the end, the religious exercise is
protected because it is part of cultural or ethnic community, but it is not
protected on its own merits as an individual right.
As a result, while minority religions which are strongly attached to a
particular culture and ethnicity will fit Mandla definition of an ethnic group
as a “distinct community by virtue of certain characteristics,”167 such a
standard does not work as easily when dealing with large, diverse religions
such as Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. These larger religions transcend
the requirement of a “distinct community” because their adherents are
widespread and extremely culturally and ethnically diverse. When the
British courts attempted to apply the Mandla test to free exercise claims
brought by adherents of these religions, the result was a somewhat strained
judicial interpretation. In JFS, for example, the British Supreme Court
ruled that all people who claim to be Jewish, regardless of their original
background, the form of Judaism they practice, or actual ancestry, were to
be deemed part of a single Jewish ethnic group.168 The British Supreme
Court was clearly seeking to preserve the plaintiff’s ability to freely
identify himself as Jewish for the purpose of seeking admission to JFS, in
straining the Race Relations Act to accommodate this type of free exercise.
However, in straining the court’s jurisprudence so as to make Judaism into
an ethnicity, the decision resulted in a severe requirement that religion be
subordinated to another protected class such as ethnicity. In addition, the
162. See generally Human Rights Act, 1998, (U.K.)..
163. See generally, R. (on the Application of E) v. Governing Body of JFS, [2009] UKSC 15;
[2010] 2 A.C. 728 (S.C.) (appeal taken from Eng.); Mandla (Sewa Singh) v. Dowell Lee [1983] 2 A.C.
548 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
164. See Race Relations Act art. 1(1)(b)(ii).
165. See generally Mandla, 2 A.C. 548.
166. See generally id.; R. (on the Application of Begum) v. Headteacher and Governors of
Denbigh High School, [2006] UKHL 15; [2007] 1 A.C. 100 (H.L.) [114] (appeal taken from Eng.).
167. Mandla, 2 A.C. at 562.
168. See JFS, 2 A.C. at 753 (stating that “whatever their racial, national and ethnic background,
conversion unquestionably brings the convert within the Mandla definition of Jewish ethnicity”).

COLLINS FINAL VERSION 4 (DO NOT DELETE)

358

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

5/29/2013 3:19 PM

[Vol. 23:335

court’s disregard of the definition of “Jewish” offered by the U.K.’s Chief
Rabbi and their adoption of their own definition solidified the court’s
position as the ultimate judge of whether or not a religious expression was
valid enough to receive protection. As a result, while British courts are as
equally open to hearing free exercise claims as American courts, the
characterization of religion as something which is a part of an ethnic group
results in a much higher bar for plaintiffs to overcome. Moreover, the
addition of the requirement that the religious expression be valid and
necessary means that many claims will fail, particularly those brought by
members of larger religions, such as Christianity and Islam, whose
traditions are so diverse that it is hard to determine whether or not a certain
action is truly “necessary.”169
B. Characterization and Inquiry into Sincerity of Belief and Necessity of
Practice
The contrasting characterizations of religion offered by the British and
American courts have resulted in a different view of the scope of judicial
functions performed by the courts when they hear a free exercise case. In
the United States, the Supreme Court’s understanding of religion as an
individual right has led to the requirement that there be no inquiry into the
sincerity of the plaintiff’s beliefs, nor any analysis of whether the practice
is an integral part of the plaintiff’s belief system or is widely adhered to
among followers of that belief system.170 Since religion is an individual
matter, it follows that individuals can hold different views on what is or is
not a religious duty or what actions should be performed as an exercise of
that religion. The purpose of the Court is merely to determine whether or
not the plaintiff’s right of free exercise was violated, not whether or not the
plaintiff’s claim to that right was valid. In contrast, the U.K.’s
understanding of religion as an element of a broader cultural and ethnic
community permits courts the freedom to inquire into the validity and
authenticity of a claimed form of religious expression.171 Courts may
request advice from religious community leaders as to whether the person’s
faith is authentic and whether their free exercise claim is an action deemed
“necessary” for the adherents of that religion.172

169. See, e.g., Eweida v. BA [2010] EWCA (Civ) 80, [2010] I.C.R. 890 [892]; Begum, 1 A.C. 100.
170. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
171. See Williamson, 2 A.C. at 258.
172. See, e.g., JFS, 2 A.C. at 754 (citing the Registrar of the London Beth Din and the Chief Rabbi
of the UK as authorities who were questioned concerning how a person would be defined as a Jew);
Watkins-Singh, W.L. 2872609, ¶ 23 (citing Professor Eleanor Nesbitt as a witness concerning Sikh
traditions and customs).
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In the United States, the Supreme Court has specifically stated that
“Courts should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs . . . the guarantee
of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the
members of a religious sect . . . [and] Courts are not arbiters of scriptural
interpretation.”173 Assuming that religious beliefs and practices are
individual expressions, it follows that a religious practice does not need to
be “acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others” in order to
merit First Amendment protection.174 A practice may even be deemed
“bizarre or incredible” without falling outside of the First Amendment.175
While there are some cases where the Court will discuss the petitioner’s
beliefs in detail, the Court may only use these discussions to establish
whether the issue at hand is one in which the government has a compelling
interest and can therefore regulate. For example, in Yoder, the Court
discussed the history and structure of the Amish faith to articulate their
belief that the Amish educational system would adequately prepare Amish
children for adult life, and, therefore, the Amish could freely exercise their
right to have children refrain from attending formal school after 8th
grade.176 In addition, in Smith the Court refrained from discussing whether
the plaintiffs were required to use peyote as an element of their faith, and
whether the belief that they had to ingest the drug was in accordance with
the wider Native American community’s stance on peyote.177
In contrast, since British law views religion as an element within a
larger framework of culture and ethnicity, British courts are permitted to
make significant inquiries into the sincerity with which the claimant hold
the religious view, the validity of that form of religious expression, and the
level of duty the religion imposes on its members to take that particular
action. For analyzing sincerity, the British Supreme Court has stated that
“when the genuineness of a claimant’s professed belief is in issue in the
proceedings, the Court will inquire into and decide this issue as an issue of
fact.”178 In addition, to be protected under article 9 of the ECHR, a belief
must satisfy a list of characteristics including “consisten[cy] with basic
standards of human dignity or integrity” and “an adequate degree of
seriousness.”179
173. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715-16.
174. Id. at 714.
175. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993).
176. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 212 (stating “the testimony...showed that the Amish succeed in
preparing their high school age children to be productive members of the Amish community”).
177. See generally Smith, 494 U.S. 872.
178. Williamson, 2 A.C. at 258.
179. Id. at 258-59. The Court attempted to mitigate potential favoritism of majority religions by
noting that “threshold requirements should not . . . deprive minority beliefs of . . . protection.”
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In order to determine the authenticity of a religious belief, British
courts can request information from religious leaders and other
authoritative members of the community.180 However, the court remains the
ultimate judge of whether or not a belief is “necessary” enough to be given
free exercise protection. For example, in Watkins-Singh the Court
determined that the petitioner should be granted free exercise protection to
wear her Kara because it was a common expression of observance among
Sikhs, even though the petitioner’s wearing of the Kara was not required by
Sikhism as she had not been fully initiated by a guru.181 The court’s
decision to seek outside advice concerning the necessity of the practice can
benefit smaller religions whose views and actions are fairly consistent.
When dealing with large religions like Christianity or Islam, however, this
can result in a plaintiff receiving little protection. In British Airways, the
petitioner claimed that wearing a visible silver cross was an integral part of
her practice of Christianity.182 The Court denied her claim noting that
“neither [the claimant] nor any witness . . . suggested that the visible
wearing of a cross was more than a personal preference . . . there was no
suggestion that her religious belief, however profound, called for it.”183 In
this case, the court drew a distinction between an action which the plaintiff
claim was an integral part of her individual practice of Christianity, and the
status of that action as a required method of religious expression for the
greater Christian community. While the British system still offers
protection for free exercise claims, the inquiry into a petitioners’ sincerity
and the religious legitimacy of their action risks alienating people for
whom sincerity is difficult to prove, and adherents to religions which
contain a diverse number of traditions, any one of which might be deemed
necessary by some practitioners and unnecessary or a mere personal
preference by others.
C. The ECHR and Broad Statutory Protections
With the passage of the U.K. Human Rights Act in 1998184 which
incorporated the ECHR into British law,185 British citizens were given the
statutory provision of Article 9 under which they could sue for free
exercise rights.186 It is true that in some ways Article 9 can be seen as a
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

See, e.g., JFS, 2 A.C., at 754; Watkins-Singh, W.L. 2872609, ¶ 23.
See Watkins-Singh, W.L. 2872609, ¶ 29.
See British Airways, I.C.R., at 900-01.
Id.
EBERLE, supra note 119, at 32.
CARTER, supra note 84.
See generally Human Rights Act, supra note 19.
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parallel to the U.S. protections established in RFRA, as both provide a
broad, statute-based provision which parties can sue under for the right to
free exercise. However, the jurisprudence surrounding these statutes
reflects the distinctive characterizations of religion held by the United
States. and the United Kingdom.
Since the Supreme Court has clearly stated that the United States
looks only to precedent within the nation’s court system itself, and not to
any form of international law, claims brought in U.S. courts will be subject
only to the jurisprudence developed by American courts.187 Therefore,
under RFRA and its case law, free exercise may not to be disturbed unless
the government can establish that the disturbance “(1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest.”188 As part of the
European Union, however, U.K. courts must also recognize jurisprudence
developed under EU courts, including the European Court of Human
Rights.189 The text of Article 9 allows free exercise of religion to be
curtailed by “such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in
a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of
public order, health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms
of others.”190 These terms appear to place the burden on the government to
show the validity of its limitations on free exercise, similar to the way
RFRA requires the U.S. government to establish a compelling
governmental interest. However, the inclusion of terms such as “public
safety,” “public order,” and “health or morals” has allowed the European
Court of Human Rights to establish a much broader interpretation of state
interests that takes precedent over an individual’s right to free exercise.
Under U.S. law, the government must show there was no viable
alternative method of action that the government could have taken so as not
to interfere with the individual’s right to free exercise.191 The Supreme
Court has stated that “RFRA requires the Government to demonstrate that
the compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the
challenged law “to the person” – the particular claimant whose sincere
exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.”192 Furthermore, the
Court announced that “we must searchingly examine the interests that the

187. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033 (2010) (stating that “judgments of other nations and
the international community are not dispositive”).
188. RFRA §§ 3(b)(1), (2).
189. See Begum, 1 A.C., at 113.
190. ECHR, art 9.2.
191. See RFRA § 3(b)(2).
192. O Centro Espirita, 546 U.S., at 430-31.
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State seeks to promote . . . and the impediment to those objectives that
would flow from recognizing the claimed . . . exemption.”193
In contrast, the Strasbourg Court has strongly established that before a
country will be required to permit free exercise, the plaintiff must establish
that there is no alternative measure or solution which would permit the
plaintiff to continue his or her life while still freely expressing his or her
religion. Such alternative solutions are extremely broad. For example, the
Strasbourg Court held the following as viable alternatives that rendered
Article 9 claims moot: the ability to leave the church and no longer serve as
a clergyman,194 the ability to seek and accept another form of employment
which would permit duties of religious observance,195 the ability to attend a
private university which permitted the wearing of a headscarf, instead of
attending the public university which banned headscarves,196 the ability to
resign one’s job rather than be forced to work during a Holy Day,197 and the
ability to import ritually slaughtered meat from another country, instead of
slaughtering it oneself.198
The European Court of Human Rights appears to interpret the core of
Article 9 as a protection only in cases where the appellant would have
absolutely no alternative way to freely exercise his or her religion. As a
result of this incredibly high standard, plaintiffs bringing cases before
British courts which look to the decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights will find it very difficult to establish enough necessity to make the
British courts require that the activity be permitted. Since plaintiffs almost

193. Yoder, 406 U.S., at 221.
194. See X v. Denmark, App. No. 7374/76, ECHR (1976), The Law ¶ 1 (stating “their right to
leave the church guarantees their freedom of religion in case they oppose its teachings.”).
195. See Ahmad, 4 EHRR 126, ¶15 (stating “the applicant remained free to resign if and when he
found that his
teaching obligations conflicted with his religious duties.”).
196. See Karaduman, App. No. 16278/90, at The Law ¶2 (stating “The Commission takes the
view that by choosing to pursue her higher education in a secular university a student submits to those
university rules, which may make die freedom of students to manifest their religion subject to
restrictions as to place and manner intended to ensure harmonious coexistence between students of
different beliefs.”).
197. See Konttinen v. Finland, App. No. 24949/94, ECHR (1996), The Law ¶ 2, available at
http://strasbourgconsortium.org/document.php?DocumentID=4753 (“Having joined The Seventh-day
Adventist Church in 1991, he was free to relinquish his work if he considered that his professional
duties were not reconcilable with his religious convictions. He could also have taken those Fridays off
when the beginning of the Sabbath obliged him to leave work before his evening shift had ended.”).
198. See Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek, App. No. 27417/95, at The Law ¶ 80-81 (“[T]here would be
interference with the freedom to manifest one's religion only if the illegality of performing ritual
slaughter made it impossible for ultra-orthodox Jews to eat meat from animals slaughtered in
accordance with the religious prescriptions they considered applicable. But that is not the case. It is not
contested that the applicant association can easily obtain supplies of “glatt” meat in Belgium.”).
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always have the ability to change their job, change their living location,
import necessary items from another location and modify their choices in
life, these precedents make it very difficult to even conceive of a case in
which a plaintiff could bring an Article 9 claim and the state would not
have an appropriate reason as to why the plaintiff’s free exercise right
should fall before the country’s stipulations. Therefore, plaintiffs bringing
cases for free exercise in the U.K. must be prepared to rely on the
traditional British jurisprudence, which protects free expression if there is a
strong tie between the religious practice and an ethnic group, and the
religious practice is deemed a necessity for the ethnic group.199
CONCLUSION
As the “child” from its parent The United Kingdom, America was, in
some sense, an attempt to correct deficiencies which its founders saw in
their parent country. The American desire to allow for free exercise of
religion, instead of having a single national church, provided a framework
wherein both the legislature and the Supreme Court articulated an
understanding of religion as a personal matter and an individual right.
Based upon this understanding of religion, disputes concerning free
exercise claims are resolvable without having to examine the nature of the
religious belief or practice at issue. Once a sincere profession of religious
belief has been made, the only question before the court is whether the
government has a right to regulate the disputed action.
In contrast, the British understanding of religion is that it serves as one
component of a larger cultural and ethnic framework. Therefore under
British case law, for cases where a plaintiff would receive protection for his
or her ethnicity or race, protection will also be provided for acts of free
exercise of religion. However, the person performing the action must be a
member of a protected ethnic group, and the action must be deemed a
necessary practice for the group’s members. Should a plaintiff attempt to
bring a case under the ECHR, he or she will eventually find themselves
back within the British framework, as the European Court of Human Rights
consistently refuses to establish its own position on free exercise claims,
but instead defers to the national law under which the dispute arose.
In practice, the British system provides substantive support for smaller
religions that maintain fairly consistent practices and are practiced by a
subset of people who could fit the definition of an ethnic group. However,

199. See, e.g., Eweida, I.C.R. 890 (case brought under Art. 9 claim and fails); Begum, 1 A.C. 100
(case brought under Art. 9 claim and fails); JFS, 2 A.C. 728 (case brought under Race Relations Act
and succeeds).
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because the standards for establishing that the disputed action is a
necessary practice are so high, plaintiffs who are members of larger and
more diverse religious communities risk either receiving an adverse
judgment or receiving a judgment which strains the British court’s
jurisprudence in order to support the plaintiff. In contrast, the American
view benefits a broader array of plaintiffs, because it narrows the scope of
the court’s inquiry to focus on the action at issue and not the belief behind
it. While both nations uphold free exercise of religion as protected right,
the difference in the way each country characterizes religion has led to the
creation of different types of protection.

